May 15, 2024 at 05:36PM
A design flaw in the IEEE 802.11 Wi-Fi standard allows attackers to trick clients into connecting to a less secure network. This affects all Wi-Fi clients and networks and poses risks like traffic interception. Researchers propose standard updates and mitigation methods. The flaw results from the standard not mandating authentication of the network’s Service Set Identifier during client connections.
The meeting notes highlighted a significant design flaw in the IEEE 802.11 Wi-Fi standard, as discovered by researchers at KU Leuven in Belgium. This flaw allows attackers to manipulate victims into connecting to a less secure wireless network, posing risks such as traffic interception and manipulation. The flaw, documented as CVE-2023-52424, affects all Wi-Fi clients across various operating systems and networks, including widely utilized protocols such as WPA3, WEP, and 802.11X/EAP.
The researchers proposed updates to the Wi-Fi standard and mitigation methods for individuals and organizations. They demonstrated that clients can be misled into connecting to a different protected Wi-Fi network than intended, displaying a different SSID on the client’s user interface than the actual network it is connected to. This flaw arises from the fact that the IEEE 802.11 standard does not consistently require authentication of a network’s SSID when a client connects to it.
Attackers can exploit this weakness in situations where organizations have two Wi-Fi networks with shared credentials, such as separate 2.4 GHz and 5 GHz bands with different SSIDs but the same authentication credentials. By setting up a rogue access point and spoofing the SSID of a trusted network, attackers can downgrade victims to a less trusted network, posing an increased risk of known attacks and potentially neutralizing VPN protections.
To defend against such SSID confusion attacks, the researchers and VPN review site Top10VPN suggested updating the IEEE 802.11 standard to mandate SSID authentication, better protecting beacon transmissions by access points, and avoiding credential reuse across different SSIDs.
In summary, the meeting notes have outlined a critical Wi-Fi design flaw and potential defenses to mitigate the associated risks.